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Abstract: The virtuous cycle between development success and foreign policy in Cape Verde 
reflects a positive interaction between globalization and governance. Development success 
under globalization entails positive market perceptions regarding the orientation and 
predictability of policies as well as the accompanying institutional arrangements, thereby 
making foreign policy salient beyond the comparator group, or “aspirational”. Even if there is 
no universally applicable development model, an aspirational foreign policy can be built on 
positive rankings with respect to comparator groups. In Macedo and Pereira (2010), macro-
level policy and institutional combinations underpinning trade diversification and income 
convergence in West and Southern Africa are used to establish development success for Cape 
Verde and Mozambique respectively. Here, the narrative of long-term development helps 
identify the following drivers: moving towards a market economy; opening up to regional and 
global trade; increasing economic and political freedom; pursuing macroeconomic stability 
and financial reputation; ensuring policy continuity (especially in trade and industrial sectors) 
and focusing on human development (especially poverty reduction and education). Looking at 
GDP per capita and indicators of financial reputation and good governance of sub-regional 
peers is not sufficient to conclude that Cape Verde’s convergence will be sustained. 
Nevertheless, the positive interaction between trade and financial globalization, on the one 
hand, and democracy and good governance, on the other, have positive implications for the 
effectiveness of foreign policy across the region as well as in the Portuguese-speaking 
community. 
                                                 
1 This paper adapts work with Luis Brites the Portuguese deputy minister of foreign affairs since June 2011. I 
thank him and Armando Marques Guedes (AMG) for comments on an earlier draft but remain responsible for 
errors or shortcomings. Thanks are also due to Suzano Costa for the invitation to moderate a panel at the 
conference celebrating the 20th anniversary of Cape Verde Constitution as the debate helped me frame the 
argument in terms of “aspirational” foreign policy. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The global financial crisis turned the risk of excluding Africa economies from globalization 
into the certainty that poverty would worsen in most of them. Prior to this crisis, however, 
Africa accompanied the trend of sustained growth evidenced by emerging economies. 
Primarily due to the implementation of adequate structural and macroeconomic policies, 
growth was the strongest in decades (AEO, various issues). In Sub-Saharan Africa, GDP 
growth increased from an average of 3.5 % in 2000 to 5.7 % by 2005 and Burkina Faso, 
Ethiopia, Mali, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Uganda, none of which is a major primary 
commodity producer, were able to post annual growth rates of over 5 % in recent years. 
Indeed, the expansion, diversification and deepening of trade and financial links between 
countries over several decades presented an unparalleled opportunity to raise living standards 
and achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDG). Notwithstanding Africa’s improved 
economic situation, absolute poverty was still widespread when unprecedented energy and 
food price volatility brought worldwide expansion to a halt. Amidst dire global economic 
prospects, growth enhancing policies need to be assessed against progress on MDG, including 
the global partnership for development and international cooperation prospects. The economic 
perspective taken in this paper requires a rather lengthy but essential background before to 
show how Cape Verde fits into the wider picture drawn. 
The evidence suggests that development success under globalization is less a question of 
relative resource endowments or geographical location than in past waves of globalization. 
Market perception of the orientation and predictability of national economic policies, and the 
accompanying institutional arrangements, have proved to be decisive everywhere. The Asian 
crises of the mid 1990s showed that economic openness must be accompanied by good public 
and private sector governance in order for countries to take full advantage of globalization. 
Examples of the former include sound macroeconomic policies, unfailing transparency, stable 
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and rational incentive frameworks and robust financial systems coupled with effective 
supervisory and regulatory mechanisms.  
Severe regulatory failures in developed countries, uncovered by the global crisis, confirmed 
that there is no universally applicable development model. Adequate governance responses to 
globalization thus become all the more important as globalization reduces national policy 
space and increases institutional and economic interdependence at various levels. At the same 
time, a more integrated global economic context necessarily demands greater policy and 
institutional coherence as well the knowledge required to implement the associated reforms 
and monitor them through effective peer review mechanisms.  
To be sure, the highly integrated economies of the Eurozone have been incapable of managing 
payments  imbalances between debtors and creditors, the rise in public debt and financial 
stability for more than two years. With the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty, the diverse 
perspectives of the 27 EU member states found at last an institutional framework but neither 
coherence nor knowledge have been sufficient to respond to the challenge posed by the global 
crisis. 
In spite of the difficulties felt in developed countries, regional economic cooperation remains a 
valid intermediate step toward the integration of developing countries into the world economy 
(Macedo, 2011) and Cape Verde’s case is particularly interesting, in this respect. In addition to 
benefiting from regional economies of scale, their participation in reform programs within 
regional organizations also facilitates domestic authorities’ work when implementing 
politically difficult measures. Even though the financial challenges remain daunting for 
several highly indebted member states, especially those inside the Eurozone, alternatives to 
cooperative responses consistent with regional integration have not been found. Indeed, 
integration among like-minded countries, where a combination of cultural proximity and 
mutual knowledge facilitates the deepening of the integration process from a free trade area to 
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a single currency and the widening membership through successive enlargements continue to 
reflect an enduring process of international governance innovation.  
With respect to Africa, regional surveillance and peer pressure between the various partners 
have been set up and implemented over the last ten years as the African Peer Review 
Mechanism. Until 2010 it involved 30 countries of which 12 were examined: 5 from July 2002 
to 2007, 4 in 2008 and AEO (2009, p. 75) expected 6 but only 4 were carried out in 2009 
(AEO, 2010, p. 72 plus Mauritius in the 13th Forum in Kampala in late July). The effectiveness 
of mutual control devices reflects the extent to which cooperation overcomes collective action 
barriers and clears the ground for coherent reforms (Kanbur, 2004). Broader regional 
surveillance may help reduce the risks of macroeconomic slippage, resulting in a more stable, 
predictable environment – an essential factor for the private sector to flourish. Among French-
speaking countries in West and central African (so-called CFA), particularly those pegged to 
the euro, surveillance has been a driving force of economic policy coordination and integration 
even though in the 1980s enforcing the stability of the nominal exchange rate against the 
French franc led to unstable real effective exchange rates. The monetary allocation mechanism 
managed by the French Treasury kept the parity between the French franc and the CFA from 
1948 until the devaluation of the latter in 1994, which led to a real depreciation in most 
members of the West African Monetary Union. Their long experience with a monetary policy 
conducted by a strong institution that must preserve its independence vis-à-vis national 
governments has accustomed these countries to yielding some of their economic policy 
matters to a regional organization. In comparison to CFA common institutions, those in the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS, which includes Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, 
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo) have not yet been effective constituencies for 
reform. If the ECOWAS secretariat in Abuja, Nigeria were to cooperate with the Commission 
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for the African Union, or the local offices of global organizations such as the United Nations, 
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, better interaction between globalization 
and governance would probably follow. With peer pressure, better information on the 
ECOWAS partners and beyond would probably be available, facilitating business development 
and a more active role for civil society.  
The idea of producing usable information from within a cooperative framework is what we 
mean by “mutual knowledge”, a term used in a declaration on MDG approved at the 2006 
summit of the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries (CPLP) held in Bissau. Aside 
from five African countries (Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, São Tomé e 
Príncipe collectively known as PALOP), Brazil and Portugal are founding members, Timor 
Leste joined in 2001 while Equatorial Guinea, Mauritius and Senegal are associate members. 
Mutual knowledge is generally more limited and the data harder to compare outside of the 
OECD so that cooperation at the regional, sub-regional and international levels may neither 
produce knowledge of effective policies or institutions nor create conditions for their 
implementation. In fact, context-adjusted but also widely usable knowledge only results from 
identifying an appropriate constituency for each set of related problems and challenges. 
Reaching the MDG in 2015, for example, presupposed sustained pro-poor economic growth in 
addition to better governance and more aid, but there were no immediately available recipes 
on how to bring about a positive interaction between globalization and governance.  
Bourguignon et al. (2008) underline the heterogeneity of country outcomes and the difficulty 
in finding patterns even in fragile states. This heterogeneity is no surprise: to “develop a global 
partnership for development”, the eighth MDG goal, reflects disappointment with the 
performance of developing countries which seemed to follow the policy recommendations of 
the “Washington consensus” during the 1990s. As governance improvements were not 
commensurate with the challenges of globalization, especially in what concerns financial 
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markets, these countries faced recurrent financial crises which interrupted the long term 
convergence process. Alternatives to both the “one size fit all” and “each case is unique” 
development ideologies are needed in a context which cannot draw upon existing experiences 
of institutional cooperation that foster mutual trust and generate mutual knowledge. Under 
these circumstances, the quest for African development successes remains a policy as well as a 
research priority, especially acute in Sub-Saharan Africa. In a nutshell, what is at stake for 
many African countries is how to ensure that current policy and institutional arrangements in 
the spheres of trade, finance, debt, investment and technology mutually reinforce each other in 
support of equitable, rapid and sustainable growth and development. 
Against this background, the extent to which Cape Verde may represent a development 
success is assessed in terms of benchmarks in ECOWAS and beyond. Specifically, we seek to 
identify lessons for successful governance – especially in the form of aspirational foreign 
policy – are drawn from Cape Verde's development experience, including the complementarity 
of economic policies and institutional arrangements bearing on trade, finance and 
competitiveness.  
The emphasis on identifying the linkages between cultural, institutional and economic factors 
that fostered growth and development remains in this paper, organized as follows. The 
interpretative framework, detailed in section 2, focuses on the interaction between 
globalization and governance, which may be positive or negative depending on the policies 
and accompanying institutional arrangements. Specifically, economic success under 
globalization involves market perceptions regarding outcomes such as export diversification 
and narrowing of the income gap with respect to the frontier. Success is, in turn, must be 
sustained by good governance and the freedoms that citizens and residents enjoy. Section 3 
provides an historical and geographical perspective on Africa. Section 4 estimates the factors 
that determine export diversification and income growth strategies. Section 5 offers a narrative 
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of long-term development with respect to foreign trade, economic growth, macroeconomic 
policy and financial reputation on which Cape Verde’s foreign policy is based. Once again, 
policy and institutional reforms provide context for good governance indicators and progress 
towards the MDG in a separate sub-section. The concluding section 6 raises the issue of how 
cooperative governance and peer-review mechanisms can be reflected in an aspirational 
foreign policy. 
2. Interpreting how Globalization and Governance interact with Convergence  
Policy and institutional responses must necessarily change as the nature of globalization itself 
changes. Indeed, three different waves of globalization (15th, 19th and 20th centuries, 
including the past decade) have interacted with different forms of governance responses. The 
interaction of globalization and governance is always context-specific, as defined by space 
(geography) and time (history). In the wave since the 1990s, the context is captured by 
convergence, often measured as the gap in per capita income relative to the frontier, and by 
democracy, often measured in terms of electoral competition and political participation but 
best understood by its constituent political and economic elements (Przeworski et al., 2000).  
Garoupa and Tavares (2009) label a country as democratic if its governments are designated 
through elections in which more than one party competes and the winning party is not always 
the same and show that higher income increases the survivability of democracy. Persson and 
Tabellini (2006) go one step further and introduce quality considerations through the concept 
of democratic capital. To enhance the quality of the democracy measure, we look at the index 
of political rights and of civil liberties published by Freedom House and at the indexes of 
economic freedom published by the Fraser Institute and the Heritage Foundation. The 
Freedom House Index defines democracy as a concept with attributes of political rights and 
civil liberties. Political rights include the right to vote, fair and free competition for the office, 
the presence of multiple parties and decentralized political power. Civil liberties refer to the 
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existence of a free press, open public discussion and freedom of speech and assembly. Since 
political rights and civil liberties are highly correlated, we replace them with the average of 
both. This composite indicator performed better in estimation and, in addition, it also has the 
advantage of being interpretable as an index of political freedom, given that it captures its two 
mains constituent components. We also note that these measures must be used and interpreted 
with caution due to well known issues, most of which derive from the process of index 
construction itself, as pointed out by Oman and Arndt (2006).  
These caveats should be borne in mind when reading some of our results. Countries are rated 
according to two 7-point scales, with 1 being the highest score for both scales. The sum of the 
points obtained in the scales classifies the country as free (2-5), partly free (6-10) or not free 
(11-14). The Freedom House Index dates from 1995 and includes data on ten components: 
business freedom, trade freedom, fiscal freedom, government spending, monetary freedom, 
investment freedom, financial freedom, property rights, freedom from corruption and labor 
freedom. Each component is measured by various indicators and is assigned a grade in a scale 
of 0 to 100. The ten component scores are then averaged to give an overall economic freedom 
score for each country. Although the definition of economic freedom is quite vague, and 
consequently measuring it lacks some precision, the index gains relevance worldwide as 
several studies reveal that there is an important relationship between economic freedom and 
positive social and economic values such as per capita income, economic growth rates, human 
development, democracy, the elimination of poverty, and environmental protection. Political 
rights are associated with free and fair elections for the executive and legislative branches of 
power, freedom to constitute political parties, freedom of association, independence from 
political, religion and military authorities, real possibilities of the change of power and other 
related aspects of the political system. Key elements of civil liberties include freedom of 
thought, religion, association, free press and respect for the rights of minorities. The concept 
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of economic freedom is more difficult to define as it may relate only to private ownership, 
prices being determined by market forces, de jure and de facto entry and exit, efficient rule of 
law and official economic regulation guaranteeing competition or also include the financial 
freedom brought about by currency convertibility, stability of money value, central bank 
independence and deep financial markets. Furthermore, the widely used indexes include low 
taxes, a small share of government spending in GDP and flexible labor markets, and this 
appears to some as too extensive a definition of economic freedom.  
Bonaglia et al. (2009, following Macedo, 2001) report that trade openness reduces perceived 
corruption, even after correcting for its endogeneity, and claims that this was the way in which 
globalization improves governance, given highly significant historical control variables (e.g. 
protestant tradition, de facto democracy and OECD membership). Eichengreen and Leblang 
(2006) find a two-way interaction between democracy and globalization over the entire 1870-
2000 period, distinguishing trade from financial openness but measuring democracy as a 
dichotomous variable. By introducing the extension of suffrage, for example, a negative 
interaction between democracy and debt default has been found for the period of the classical 
gold standard, with a more than proportional effect in capital-poor countries. At the time, 
parliamentary democracies were seen as sources of financial stability, to the extent that the 
checks and controls on the sovereign implied a greater ability to tax (Flandreau and Zummer, 
2004, p. 44 report an elasticity of 0.5 for the whole sample and of 1.3 for capital-poor 
countries). This contradicts the widespread view that the repression of democracy facilitated 
the operation of the pre-1914 international monetary system by making external adjustment 
easier during the second wave of globalization in the late 19th century. Over the period 1970-
2004, thus fully in the third wave, the different types of freedom interact differently with the 
trade and financial globalization variables, and the interaction becomes more sensitive to 
regional context and to stages of national economic and institutional development. Overall, 
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allowing for the quality of democracy lowers the overall effect of globalization on democracy. 
One reason for this is the hypothesis that globalization’s effects on democracy are mediated by 
slow-moving cultural values. This would imply that such variables might be accounted for by 
selecting groups of like-minded countries, like the OECD, for which the effect of globalization 
on freedoms would be stronger but this would neglect the convergence dimension, more 
visible on a global scale. Eichengreen and Leblang’s (2006) also use a measure, “Age of 
Democracy”, which counts for each country i at time t the number of uninterrupted year up to 
time t that country i has been democratic, i.e. its measures the length of time a country has 
been a democracy which is used in section 4 below. In addition, we employ data from the 
POLITY project, which codes countries’ level of democracy as a function of institutional rules. 
POLITY is also the source of information on constitutional age. POLITY defines constitutional 
change as occurring either when there is a political transition or when the absolute value of the 
score changes by at least three points. This allows for constitutional changes in both 
democracies and dictatorships.  
Given these measures, the mutual relationship between globalization, governance and 
economic performance can be described along the following lines: a nation’s resource 
endowments and its productivity determine how fast it can grow and the level of its economic 
well-being in terms of income per capita, both in absolute terms and relative to the income 
frontier. Feed-backs are possible: a richer country growing fast may invest more resources in 
scientific research and technology development and thus enjoy higher productivity levels than 
a poorer, slow-growing economy. Through trade, capital flows or migration, globalization can 
influence the level of endowments available in an economy, or even, through international 
technology transfers, its productivity. Conversely a country’s endowments of natural 
resources, labor, and capital, as well as its geographic location and efficiency of its production 
structures may determine how much it trades with the rest of the world in terms if goods, 
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services and assets. Similarly, a country with good governance, namely a democratic state with 
high-quality institutions, effective corruption-free accountable bureaucracies, and a flourishing 
civil society may likely increase the quality, if not the quantity, of its most important 
endowment: its own people. Once more, cause and effect can be swapped: well-endowed 
countries may evolve towards democratic forms of government more easily, or, at least, they 
may afford investing more resources to build well-functioning institutions.  
While these interactions have been at the core of economics, this has not been the case of the 
issue addressed in this section (“how globalization and governance interact with 
convergence”), perhaps because of the interdisciplinary nature of globalization waves and of 
governance innovation - even when the distance to frontier is not as fundamental as it is for 
Africa. With respect to the relative strengths of the links between the current wave of 
globalization, the benchmark measure of freedoms and convergence, the empirical findings of 
Macedo et al (2007) reveal that political rights and civil liberties had a significant impact in 
the run-up to the third wave of globalization while feedbacks were somewhat weaker. As 
mentioned, further work is needed to understand the long-run dynamics and sustainability of 
this global system, in particular the mechanisms that could enforce or reinforce the expected 
positive effect of globalization on both convergence and freedoms. The particular interaction 
which involves democracy reflects historical, geographical, social, cultural, institutional and 
economic factors and the method employed focuses on the economic aspect of this 
relationship. A complementary explanation of the interaction between globalization and 
governance can be based on the manner in which diversity, be it socio-cultural or economic is 
addressed by a given society. Indeed, one of the constants of human organization is the 
“absolute certainty that man will never be common, he will always de different, he will always 
give rise to diversity. And society, by managing this diversity, will manage prosperity and the 
creation of wealth” (Borges de Macedo 1996, p.194). The same holds true, of course, for the 
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case of political diversity and whether peace or conflict ensues. This is taken up in the next 
section, with specific reference to the historical roots of CPLP in the first wave of 
globalization, associated with the Iberian maritime explorations of the 15th century. 
The available empirical evidence regarding the relationship between economic growth and 
political regime is weak or inconclusive, as discussed in Kohli (1986), Remmer (1990) and 
Przeworski and Limongi (1993). In the case of Africa, it is not possible to establish a clear link 
between political regime and economic growth according to Young (1998), amongst others. 
However, the poor economic performance of many of its authoritarian regimes during the 
1980s suggests that these failed to promote economic growth. Indeed, Maravall (1995) notes 
that “a strong case can be made that economic reforms are more likely to succeed in a 
democratic political context. Political pluralism generates more and better information to use 
in economic decision making; moreover, democratic institutions may reduce the transaction 
costs of economic reforms, as well as restrict predation of public resources.” Looking at the 
Economic Freedom Index in Sub-Saharan Africa, we see that it is not only the poorest but also 
the most economically repressed world region: no country belong in the group of 
economically free countries, 7 are listed in the “mostly free group”, 28 in the “mostly not-
free” and 7 in the “repressed” group. More worrisomely, in the region, a decline in economic 
freedom is evident. Factors like corruption, excessive market regulation or the size of black 
market are among the reasons for such a poor result. Results on G&G in the form of the 
diversification-convergence interaction suggest that economic convergence increases with 
political and economic freedom. Indeed, the focus on the management of diversity as a 
determinant of positive interaction between globalization and governance is especially 
necessary in connection with Africa, because the knowledge thereabout is certainly less 
“mutual” than with respect to other regions, even outside of the OECD.  
3. History and Geography  
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3.1. World Regions 
Three “regions” (North America, EU, ASEAN + China, Korea, Japan) account for ¼ each of 
world GDP. Africa is in the “rest of the world” which includes over ½ of world population, 
with other significant actors (Brazil, Russia, India) and salient regions (Middle East). Taking a 
global view should foster governance innovation, as dominant players have different strengths 
(Nye, 2002). Yet free rider problems prevent cooperation among abstract regions, especially 
those where there are no peer review mechanisms let alone a culture of cross-cutting 
intergovernmental cooperation, as seemed to be the case in the rest of the world significant 
actors and even in China, certainly before the creation of the Group of 20 (Macedo, 2011). In 
addition, around 70 “fragile states”, most of which located in Africa, are very specific in their 
fragility (Bourguignon et al 2008).  
Looking at the rest of the world, the share of world GDP accounted for by Africa plus South 
America combined doubled from 1820 to 1950. The share remained constant since at around 
10% with North America and EU roughly equal to Asia (including Japan, Russia and Turkey), 
shares that are comparable to those prevailing in 1820. In 1950, however, North America and 
EU accounted for 60% and Asia for 30%. In terms of population Africa and South America 
combined have more than doubled their combined world share from 10% in 1820 to 15% in 
1950 to 22% in 2003 while Asia has dropped from ¾ to ½ and then rose again to 2/3. In terms 
of GDP per capita, the relative shares are ½ for Africa and South America combined and over 
2/3 for Asia.  
As emphasized in AEO (2010, box 2.2), strengthening the capacity of the national statistical 
systems is required for a results based management framework which in turn helps regional 
integration processes based on peer review. A statistical capacity indicator in Sub Saharan 
Africa is highest for South Africa (78) followed by Cape Verde (63). AEO (2010, p. 47). The 
partnership known as PARIS21, hosted by the OECD, has been in operation since 1999 and on 
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its tenth anniversary produced the Dakar declaration on the development of statistics One year 
before, the Lisbon declaration on science for global development included the promotion of 
science and technology indicators for CPLP (Giovaninni et al., 2008; Macedo, 2008). Indeed, 
the data drawn from the impressive database of the late Angus Maddison underscores this lack 
of knowledge. In year 1 there are only estimates of GDP for the five North African countries 
(Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia), estimates of GDP for Ghana and South Africa 
begin in 1820 and for the remaining Sub-Saharan Africa countries in 1950. The share of Africa 
in world GDP falls from over 4% to under 3% in 1000, 1% in 1500 and around .8% until 
1820, when it begins to rise to about 1.2% in 1913. In 1950, when estimates for 34 new 
countries become available, the Africa share reaches under 4% again while Sub-Saharan 
Africa remains just under 3%. Since then both shares have declined about 1pp of world GDP. 
As for the share of SSA in Africa, it rose from around 20% until 34% in 1913 and more than 
doubled to ¾ in 1950. Thereafter the Sub-Saharan share of Africa GDP declined by more than 
10 percentage points but the share of ECOWAS in Sub-Saharan Africa remained at 40%. The 
increase in population has been such that the relative stability in the share of world GDP 
implies a decline in GDP per capita of about 20 percentage points, from 42% of world GDP 
per capita in 1950 to 24% in 2003. The corresponding figure for Sub-Saharan Africa is 18%, 
forecast by IMF to rise to 21% in 2013.  
The views of “development as self discovery” (Haussman and Rodrik, 2003) and the “ladder 
of competitiveness” (Causa and Cohen, 2006) suggest measures of competitiveness that go 
beyond relative unit labor costs (Branson et al., 1987) and other refinements presented in the 
country narrative below. The main point, once again, is that diversity must be taken into 
account. While the impressive database used in Maddison (2007) has been criticized, it allows 
a “millennial” perspective on world regions and helps to avoid the pitfalls of a purely 
geographic approach. Maddison (2001, p. 71-75) acknowledges the specificity of the 
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Portuguese empire. Macedo and Pereira (2007) were inspired to study the diversity of 
Portugal’s and Portuguese speaking countries’ responses to globalization by drawing on the 
concept of “differenciality” due to Borges de Macedo and discussed in Macedo et al. (2009a). 
Regions may be historical rather than geographical and interaction during the first wave of 
globalization and even the second did not involve nearly as many players as the current one. 
The complementarity between globalization and regional integration and the development 
paradigm based on mutual accountability first contained in the 2002 Monterrey declaration on 
MDG both suggest that in Africa interaction between globalization and governance has been 
weak. Nevertheless, Macedo et al. (2012) present evidence to the effect that complementary 
reforms accelerate growth in developing countries. 
3.2. The common historical legacy 
The combination of Africa and South America is more obvious when the Atlantic side is 
considered. In effect, during the first wave of globalization Mozambique was ruled from Goa, 
India and the influence remained after the forced union with the Spanish Crown (1580-1640) 
even though India suffered the competition from Brazil during the 1700s. Contrary to what is 
sometimes believed, there was a fair amount of decentralization in the Portuguese empire and 
financial reputation was preserved: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009, Tables 6.1-2-4-6, pp. 86-99) 
record one bankruptcy in Portugal from 1300 until 1812, against 7 bankruptcies in Spain and 9 
in France. With the departure of the Crown Regent to Brazil in the wake of the first 
Napoleonic invasion in 1807 essentially moved the capital to the New World (Maxwell, 2004). 
The Crown remained in Rio de Janeiro after the congress of Vienna and the liberal revolution 
of the 1820s. Brazil remained an empire until 1890 and was therefore the sole monarchy in the 
Americas during most of the 19th century2. On the other side, the dispute between the two sons 
                                                 
2 AMG reminded me of other exceptions such as Mexico, with Emperor Maximilian, and Canada, which to this 
day has the Queen of England as its formal Head of State to reflect on the broader issue left implicit in the text: 
“This anti-monarchical drift was, of course, the outcome of the treble whammies inflicted by the French and 
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of the Regent, Pedro and Miguel, led to unrest and civil war in Portugal from the declaration 
of Brazil’s independence until the defeat of the absolutist brother in 1834. In spite of a 
successful stabilization in the 1850s when it joined the gold standard, Portugal suffered from 
the 1890 crisis and the currency became inconvertible. In fact, full convertibility was not 
restored until 1992! 
The transition of Brazil from Empire to Republic coincided with the financial crisis and the 
first default quickly followed the one of Portugal. During the period until 1890 six defaults 
were recorded in Portugal against seven in Spain and zero in France and Brazil (Reinhart and 
Rogoff, 2009, Table 10.2, p. 149 also report the share of years in default since independence or 
1800, which is similar in Brazil and Spain while France stands out for the share in a banking 
crisis). 
Similarly, successive Portuguese revolutions in 1910, 1918, 1926 and 1974 influenced the 
independence of the former African colonies, together with their own very diverse initial 
experiences with political and economic freedom. For example, the presumption that political 
freedom is incompatible with financial instead of complementary damages financial reputation 
considerably because when political rights decrease the capacity to tax, countries become 
serial defaulters, but they are capable of graduating, given sufficient time, according to 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). Thus, the experience of Portugal with IMF adjustment programs 
in the 1970s and the 1980s and the regime change towards nominal stability in the 1990s may 
also be relevant to understand how foreign policy can help acquire or recover financial 
reputation (Bliss and Macedo, 1990 and Macedo, 2009). 
This paper follows previous attempts to contribute towards greater mutual knowledge within 
the CPLP with respect to the MDG (IICT, 2007; Macedo, 2008). Indeed, the Declaration on 
                                                                                                                                                        
Indian Wars of 1754-1763 (a regional parcel of the Seven Years War), the US independence which flowed from 
them, in 1776, and the later and rather lengthier and less discernible Simón Bolivar-led breakaway moves made 
sure monarchical regimes would not find a suitable ‘political ecosystem’ in the New World.”  
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MDG in CPLP (approved at the 2006 Bissau summit mentioned in the introduction) sees 
cooperative governance as capable of producing “mutual knowledge” among the eight 
member states based on the fact that the standards of appropriateness regarding policy and 
institutional reform may be less responsive to geography than to historical affinities. In spite 
of their geographical discontinuity, five Portuguese-speaking African countries formed the 
PALOP group in 1979, and held ten summits until 1992, when they signed the first Regional 
Indicative Program with the EU. With Timor-Leste joining in 2001, there are now six ACP 
Portuguese-speaking countries cooperating under the 10th European Development Fund. They 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the European Commission on the eve of the 
second Europe-Africa summit in late 2007, which extended to CPLP. Future activities, 
integrated into a multi-country approach, focus on democratic governance as a key 
determinant for poverty reduction. 
3.2. A common historical legacy 
The development community recognizes that Cape Verde, a small island state devoid of 
natural resources, is actively seeking to overcome adverse developmental conditions, either 
due to geography or history. For example, in 2005 a five year contract was signed with the 
Millennium Challenge Corporation even though income per capita was above the eligibility 
ceiling. This was largely seen as an incentive for the country to continue its efforts on the 
development front. As expected, graduation to middle income status occurred in late 2007 and, 
at the suggestion of Luxemburg and Portugal, Cape Verde also signed a special partnership 
with the EU. Assessing development successes in West Africa requires comparisons among 
states with different cultural, historical and strategic affinities. ECOWAS was established in 
1975 and now includes 15 countries, as listed above. Cape Verde represents 0.3% of GDP, 
0.2% of population in ECOWAS and 168% of average GDP per capita. Note that currently 
ECOWAS accounts for almost 1/3 of Sub-Saharan Africa in terms of GDP and of population. 
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Within CPLP, on the other hand, the weight of Brazil is such that the number equivalent is 1.4 
members, the other seven being same as the other two in NAFTA!  
Common features in the five PALOP may reflect institutions preceding independence, in spite 
of very diverse experiences with political and economic freedom since then. As mentioned, 
financial reputation suffers when political rights decrease the capacity to tax and there is no 
constituency to control spending. Like Portugal since 1979, some PALOP have been able to 
improve their credit rating through appropriate policies. The comparative evolution of GDP 
per capita in 1990 international dollars from 1950 until 2006 for PALOP and Sub-Saharan 
Africa averages shows a more volatile growth pattern for the former group with more 
pronounced growth in the 1950s and the last decade. This reflects civil wars following 
independence especially in Angola and Mozambique, the two larger economies.  
3. 3. Top rankings for Cape Verde 
In spite of the common colonial history, the pattern of each one of the five PALOP is very 
specific: Figure 1 compares GDP per capita in Cape Verde to the ECOWAS average over six 
decades. The source is the Maddison database which contains two outliers for GDP of Cape 
Verde in million Geary-Khemis international dollars. The series is 1990: 430; 1991: 283; 
1992: 231; 1993: 434 and the correction was interpolating the two outliers, so that GDP per 
capita growth is smoothed during those years. Unless otherwise noted, Tables and Figures are 
reproduced from Macedo and Pereira (2010). 
According to AEO, Cape Verde is ranked first among PALOP in export diversification 
(average 10 from 1997 to 2008, twice the number in Mozambique), economic freedom (62 in 
2010, ahead of Mozambique with 56) as well as corruption perception (Transparency 
International ranking of 46 only double digit in group): Frankel (2010) presents governance 
rankings alongside GDP per capita figures along the same lines, suggesting that islands like 
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Cape Verde and Mauritius are somehow “less African”. Be that as it may: comparing GDP 
growth rates since 1950 shows a growth differential of almost 2% for Cape Verde relative to 
ECOWAS, in spite of a negative differential of 4 pp in the 1970s.  
After achieving independence in 1975, Cape Verde was governed under a one-party system 
that pursued an inward-looking, activist development program based on central planning and 
an economically dominant public sector, particularly in banking, transportation, insurance and 
energy. Motivated by the need to overcome the colonial legacy while minimizing the risk of 
possible political resistance, the new government adopted a protectionist trade regime and 
controlled the economy directly. As consequence, there was limited scope for competitive 
export promotion and foreign direct investment was also discouraged: the resulting loss of 
competitiveness and the reduction of foreign direct investment became major constraints for 
sustainable long-run growth (Lourenço and Foy, 2003). As of 1988, a wide-ranging program 
of reforms aimed at trade liberalization and privatization reduced the government’s role to 
essentially that of building badly needed infrastructure but the country was governed under a 
one-party system until 1990. Popular dissatisfaction, which made itself felt via members of the 
elites rather than as wider social movements, led to free legislative and presidential elections 
and a constitutional amendment establishing a multi-party system in 19913. Economic reforms 
gathered further pace after the country held free elections. The Movement for Democracy 
(MpD) took power away from the African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde (PAICV) 
that had led Cape Verde since independence and amended the 1980 constitution to allow for a 
multiparty democracy. The MpD government continued the economic reforms started by its 
predecessor, especially those pertaining to financial and foreign exchange markets. Since the 
                                                 
3 AMG reminded me of a comment he made during the debate on the Cape Verde Constitution of 1992: “One 
shouldn’t overlook the external political dimension, here: Moscow’s loosening of its grip on the further reaches 
of its holdings in the M. Gorbatchov phase, largely driven by the Reagan’s Administration policies against the 
hold of the “Empire of Evil” systemically pressed for that, and did so inexorably”. 
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adoption of this regime, legislative elections have produced results considered to be non-
fraudulent and changes in government have been orderly.  
Indeed, the fact that democratic governance has taken root is widely recognized by various 
governance indicators. The 2008 Ibrahim Index of African Governance ranks Cape Verde 
second overall in a sample comprising 48 Sub-Saharan countries. Cape Verde has good results 
in terms of safety and security, sustainable economic opportunity, participation and human 
rights and human development, with safety and security obtaining the highest score and 
sustainable economic opportunity the lowest. Data from the Freedom House Index also 
confirms the good results of Cape Verde in terms of political stability: Cape Verde is defined 
as free, obtaining the highest scores (1) for political rights and civil liberties. The presence of 
“creolisation / métissage” from the first settlers helped promote the view of peace and 
development. This “peace culture” has been reinforced by the absence of civil strife and by the 
impressive performance in terms of MDG, reflecting political stability, security, good 
governance and functioning democratic institutions. This insular nation has become an 
example of best practice: its neutrality in the region lead to its role of mediator – good 
reputation (“donors’ darling”), leadership in UN reform and using culture as a means of 
promoting tourism and development.  
The argument in Santos (2010, based on her Ph.D. dissertation in peace studies a la Galtung, 
1996) is based on the thought of Amilcar Cabral (1975, 1999) who led the liberation struggle 
of Cape Verde and Guinea Bissau and influenced leaders of several other colonies especially 
Angola (Cabral, 1995, 1987; Andrade, 1978). Cardoso (1986) is also very influential and the 
previous Head of State provides a personal account of the societal roots of foreign policy in 
Cape Verde (Pires, 2010 the acceptance speech of an honorary doctorate). However, current 
fears about sustainability of public and external accounts (Banco de Portugal, 2012) echo 
claims that the decline in competitiveness and the reduction in foreign direct investment 
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remained major constraints on sustainable long-run growth (Lourenço and Foy, 2003). 
4. Analyzing the Convergence-Diversification Relationship  
The two-way relationship between trade diversification and income convergence was 
motivated by the interpretative framework and by the empirical finding that economic 
development, measured by per capita income, entails more diversification. The general 
observation is that economies become more diversified as incomes increase before reaching a 
turning point beyond which they become less diversified - a stage not yet observed in Sub-
Saharan Africa (Cabral and Veiga, 2010 use data disaggregated at five different levels, noting 
that the results remain broadly similar independently of the level of aggregation used). In other 
words, development occurs when a country learns how to do new things and focus on those 
that it already does well, such as producing new goods, choosing promising export markets, 
upgrading product quality and moving into services exports. We note, in passing, that another 
strand of literature argues that diversification should focus on exporting more sophisticated 
products as these entail higher productivity levels conducive to higher growth levels (e.g. 
Hausmann et al, 2007). In this case, a country becomes what it exports, i.e. countries converge 
to the level of income implied by their exports. The common point in both approaches, 
however, is that product development is undoubtedly an important engine of growth for 
developing countries.   
Using regression analysis in a panel of 48 countries and 45 years, Cabral and Veiga (2010) 
establish that the stage of development and the economy’s size are positively correlated with 
export diversification, and that economies with larger GDPs or populations also have higher 
export sophistication levels. Moreover, both diversification and sophistication are promoted by 
trade integration, efforts to reduce transport costs as well as improvements in institutional, 
political and educational factors. When used to explain export diversification, 19 out of the 26 
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governance variables presented significant positive signs. The results were particularly robust 
for the variables reflecting government accountability, respect for the rule of law, political 
stability, effectiveness, and control of corruption (listed in Table 1). In export sophistication 
regressions, 15 out of 26 variables are not statistically significant but “transparency”, 
“accountability” and “control of corruption in the public sector”, “debt policy and fiscal policy 
rating”, “economic management cluster average” and “policies for social inclusion” have a 
positive association. It is seen that improving the education standards of the labor force 
(measured by the share of GDP spent in education or the World Bank index about “building 
human resources”) is associated with export diversification. Moreover, lower levels of 
education are associated positively with diversification while higher levels are associated with 
export sophistication. While equations in which diversification and sophistication were used to 
explain GDP growth suggested a positive but not robust relationship, higher diversification 
and sophistication were associated to lower variation in the rate of growth of both GDP and 
per capita income. The estimated coefficients suggest that a 10% per cent increase in 
diversification leads to a 4,6% decrease in the variation of GDP growth and to a 4,4% 
reduction of income per capita variability. Similar results were obtained for sophistication, 
with country fixed effects model suggesting that increasing sophistication may have a stronger 
marginal effect in decreasing economic instability than diversification in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
In addition, higher diversification and sophistication are associated with lower infant mortality 
and the higher life expectancy. The estimated coefficients are robust and the impact 
independent of that of diversification and sophistication on income per capita, which is all the 
more relevant as higher average income does not necessarily translate in better life for the 
majority of the population.  
In that context, this paper identifies macro-level policy and institutional combinations 
underpinning successful export diversification and economic convergence in ECOWAS and 
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establishes context-based objective metrics to assess the relative performance of Cape Verde 
with evidence bearing on foreign policy.  
Figure 2 shows the comparative pattern of the number-equivalent Herfindahl index and 
distance to the frontier. With respect to diversification, Cape Verde is close to 6000 while 
ECOWAS is around 5000, even though in the early nineties it decreases to 3000 and 2000 
respectively. The average annual change in the number equivalent for 5 year periods in Cape 
Verde and ECOWAS shows that, from 1976 to 2005, a new good was being exported by Cape 
Verde approximately every five and a half years (1/0.18=5.55).  
In the econometric analysis, account is taken of the different performances by defining “high” 
and “low” regimes in terms of the variables of interest. Figure 3 clearly depicts the expected 
(negative) relation between diversification and convergence when using the country means, 
i.e. mean ygap and mean neq5 for each country. When all observations are taken into account, 
there is no discernible relation between the two variables. Regarding government deficits, we 
observe that lower budget deficits are associated with increased convergence, especially when 
they are less than 6% of GDP (Figure 4). As for the relation between political and economic 
freedoms, using country averages, we see that there is a somewhat “u-shaped” relationship 
which possibly reflects the fact that the region aggregates countries with dissimilar 
characteristics on this score (Figure 5). The visual inspection of the partial relation between 
income gap and number equivalent index averages is used to sort those observations satisfying 
the condition {ygap < 0.945 & neq5 > 4.5} and those where {ygap >= 0.945 & neq5 <= 4.5} 
thus isolating the upper-left and bottom-right quadrants for further analysis. Senegal appears 
as potential regional benchmark with which to compare Cape Verde given its high intra-
regional diversification-convergence combination. The two-way relationship between 
convergence and diversification only appears in the bottom right quadrant, called the HIGH-
regime. Moreover, the estimated coefficient of the impact of diversification on convergence is 
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relatively and highly significant (-0.646 at 1% level). Under the LOW-regime, the relation is 
only 1-way as more convergence always increases diversification but not the other way round. 
For the region as whole, diversification increases with more convergence but more 
diversification actually leads to less convergence. This result is unexpected but plausible given 
the ambiguous relationship between these two variables, as depicted in Figure 4, and non-
linearities that characterize many of the partial relations between variables.  The impact of 
convergence on diversification is also weaker when compared to the HIGH-regime as the 
estimated coefficient is about half as large (-0.398 vs. -0.751). Together, these results appear to 
indicate that a critical level of diversification is needed before one observes a two-way 
relationship, ceteris paribus. 
In order to better interpret our empirical findings, as well as to highlight possible differences 
and commonalities in performance, we also look at how key model variables differ across 
HIGH and LOW regimes for each country. Note that we use each country’s of GDP per capita 
growth rate in lieu of its rate of convergence to the income frontier as the latter measure would 
also reflect changes in the United States’ GDP per capita. Interestingly, almost all of the highly 
diversified countries in ECOWAS register negative GDP per capita growth rates with the 
exception of Cape Verde. Indeed, it is striking that Cape Verde exhibits not only the highest 
GDP per capita growth rate in ECOWAS but also one that is fairly consistent across both 
regimes. This finding accords with those in section 3 and is also reflected in the Cape Verde 
dummy variable reported in Macedo and Pereira (2010) contributes towards more convergence 
under the full sample, with an effect almost on par to that of the benchmark dummy. Note also 
that while Cape Verde is not as diversified as Senegal, it has increased its number equivalent 
appreciably between regimes as a result of its positive diversification trend over time.  
Turning to the other policy variables, more inflation leads to more convergence under the full-
sample and LOW-regime. In the case of the latter, more inflation also leads to diversification 
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as does a higher budget deficit. This result could mean that increased diversification is 
associated with less macroeconomic stability. For the HIGH-regime, no relation between 
inflation and diversification is found while increased budget deficits lead to less diversification 
and have no effect on convergence. A greater degree of openness leads to less diversification 
and more convergence under this regime and has no impact whatsoever on the others: inflation 
is generally lower under the HIGH-regime for countries experiencing both regimes (with the 
exception of Ivory Coast) while government deficits are higher but only moderately so in most 
cases and always less than 10% of GDP. For Cape Verde, the result of government deficit 
consolidation as diversification increased is very clear as is the dramatic lowering of its 
inflation rate. Diversification coupled with convergence also appears to go hand in hand with 
an average degree of openness in the range of 60-80% of GDP based on Ivory Coast, Cape 
Verde and Senegal’s performance on this score.  
As for the institutional variables, convergence increases as political and economic freedom 
increases in ECOWAS. Also, there is more convergence as the age of democracy increases, 
and this holds true for the LOW-regime. However, an increase in the number of democracies 
in the system unexpectedly reduces convergence. Under the HIGH-regime, diversification 
increases with more political and more economic freedom. In the other two cases, 
diversification is associated with more economic freedom only. Indeed, the effect of economic 
freedom is pervasive across all samples and its effect is largest precisely under the HIGH-
regime. In the full sample, being an older democracy also leads to less diversification as do a 
larger number of prior transitions to dictatorship in the LOW-regime. There is also more 
convergence under an English legal tradition.  
These results suggest that a positive relation must exist between economic and political 
freedoms, which may have to exceed some critical threshold, in order for there to be an 
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environment conducive to convergence (full sample). In addition, economic freedom may be a 
necessary, but not sufficient, condition to underpin successful diversification.  
5. Comparative Description  
The insights from the estimation of diversification convergence regimes to successful 
development experiences can be embedded into a comparative description of the broad 
dimensions of economic growth and foreign trade, of macroeconomic policy and financial 
reputation and on progress on the MDG and other governance indicators. This is done in three  
different sub-sections.  
5. 1. Economic Growth and Foreign Trade  
During the 1970s, the growth rate of Cape Verde GDP was positive (0.18%) but below the 
ECOWAS average (1.18%). In contrast, it averaged 6.85% during the 1980s while ECOWAS 
reported a decline of -0.64%. The reversal of fortunes continued during the 1990s, with a 
growth rate above the ECOWAS average (3.89% vs. -0.20%) and over the 2000-6 period 
(1.04% vs. 0.86%). Cape Verde’s improved growth performance seems to follow its policy and 
institutional reforms. Describing their impact on exports, these were derived mainly from a 
relatively limited natural resource base. During 1988-1997, exports consisted mainly of 
primary sector products, namely fish and crustacean, and so were neither diversified nor high 
value-added.  The 1976 decision to join ECOWAS was possibly one of the few exceptions to 
the otherwise protectionist trade policy. In practice, ECOWAS trade is of reduced importance, 
as ECOWAS members produce similar manufactured products. Clearly of greater importance 
was the decision to diversify production during 1992-6, which went hand in hand with greater 
trade openness and a market-orientated policy stance. As a result, exports grew substantially. 
After a dramatic decline of over 40% in 1993, exports surged to almost 4% in 1997. The 
destination of exports also changed, as these were now directed mainly towards the European 
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Union, particularly Portugal and Spain. Most of the export growth, however, has been in 
tourism notwithstanding the cyclical efforts to diversify the fishing and industrial sectors since 
the 1990s.  
When the government shifted away from a policy of state-control to a free-market one in 
1988, tourism also began to development substantially. In line with this policy change, Werlin 
(1996) observes that this sector’s development entailed the synchronization of public and 
private investment in infrastructure. Legislation was also passed to encourage tourism, which 
included streamlining approval of qualified projects, allowing for a gaming industry and 
setting up a regulatory and enforcement framework. Furthermore, a standard service fee was 
levied on the users, as opposed to service providers, which helped finance tourism. Direct 
public investment in infra-structure construction, such as hotels and transportations, was also 
pursued. Tourism’s contribution to GDP increased from approximately 2% in 1995 to 5% in 
2000 and 10% in 2005 (Mitchell, 2008). As noted in IMF (2008a), the balance of payments 
changed from being very dependent on international aid and emigrants’ remittances to being 
based on tourism and tourism-related foreign direct investment. In 2001, services exports and 
foreign direct investment surpassed for the first time transfers as a percentage of GDP. Indeed, 
Cape Verde became the fastest growing market within the group of tourism based economies 
whose travel exports have exceeded 10% of GDP for at least one year during 1998-2007, 
reporting an average annual growth rate of tourism services around 30% during 2000-2006. 
During the same period Croatia registered an average annual growth rate of 20%, the second 
highest. Tourism is highly pro-cyclical, however, so an excessive reliance on it increases 
output volatility unless exports of goods and services are sufficiently diversified. 
Unfortunately, tourism is absent from the OECD database used in the empirical work. 
When it returned to power in 2001, PAICV pursued growth-orientated policies whilst 
rationalizing and reducing import taxes and seeking to rein in the budget deficit. Joining the 
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World Trade Organization in 2008 required a transparent and predictable trade and foreign 
investment environment, which accelerated Cape Verde’s global integration. It also promoted 
Trade integration had already been promoted through increased access to preferential markets, 
such as the US and EU through the African Growth and Opportunity Act and the Cotonou 
agreement. Although graduated to middle income the status, it continued to benefit from 
preferential market access for least developed countries. Recent governments have continued 
the reform process, including those of relevance to financial and exchange markets. Growth 
has been sustained by the service sector, namely transports, hotel and restaurants and 
communications, and also due to increased spending on education and improved governance. 
Indeed, the importance of the service sector, largely in tourism, was evident as early as 1980. 
Its continued success depends on further improving required infrastructure, namely good 
communications and a liberalized air transport market. The reform process notwithstanding, 
the labor market is relatively rigid and administered prices still exist e.g., in the energy sector. 
Thus structural problems persist and they make adjustment to external shocks more difficult. 
5.2. Macroeconomic Policy and Financial Reputation 
Cape Verde’s business cycles have become more synchronized with developed economies 
following increasing trade and financial integration into the world economy (Ribeiro, Martins 
and Loureiro, 2008). Regarding foreign financing sources, emigrant’s remittances accounted 
for 12% of GDP in 2006, and their low volatility has allowed for consumption-smoothing in 
response to external shocks. However, remittances have become more pro-cyclical in recent 
years, e.g. the correlation between (de-trended) GDP and remittances was around 65% for the 
period 1980-2006. This fact may be associated with investment-driven flows rather than 
traditional consumption-smoothing behavior. Since financial flows are far more volatile and 
less prone to act as a buffer in times of crisis, this is another challenge to Cape Verde. 
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Adequate implementation and control is also required to ensure that increased foreign direct 
investment translates into higher growth and employment.  
Industrial policy in the 1980s was characterized by less state intervention and more 
privatization, which led to the creation of a vibrant private sector that contributed positively to 
growth. 
In terms of currency regime, Cape Verde Escudo has been pegged, first to a basket of 
currencies during 1977-98 and to the Euro thereafter. Exchange rate changes have thus not 
played a major role in engineering gains in competitiveness. Moreover, the low volatility 
reflects the control of inflation over the 1990’s.  
A real effective exchange rate index represents a nominal effective exchange rate index adjusted 
for relative movements in national price or cost indicators of the home country and selected 
countries. A nominal effective exchange rate index, meanwhile, represents the ratio (expressed 
on the base 2000=100) of an index of a currency’s period- average exchange rate to a weighted 
geometric average of exchange rates for the currencies of selected countries, where an increase 
implies appreciation and conversely (Table 2, from Banco de Portugal, 2012). Unlike the 
paradox of nominal stability and real instability in CFA countries in the 1980s, mentioned at 
the outset  (Macedo, 1986, p. 358), the real effective exchange rate has been relatively stable.  
The empirical results in section 4 did not use these indices due to database incompatibilities 
but they did establish that lower budget deficits (less than 7% of GDP) are associated with 
convergence. Not unrelated, Cape Verde also compares favorably to its sub-regional average 
in financial reputation. As discussed in Lopes and Santos (2010, following Macedo et al., 
2009b), this can be proxied by a variable measuring exchange market pressure (EMP, a 
weighted sum of the nominal depreciation rate against the euro, changes in foreign reserves 
excluding gold and changes in the interest rate differential). The weights for reserves and for 
the interest rate differential are given by the standard deviation of depreciation relative to the 
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respective variable, to avoid that the most volatile components of EMP dominates the others. 
As mentioned, Cape Verde compares well to the ECOWAS average of the governance 
indicators reported in Table 1. The same applies to the “financial credibility factor” derived 
from EMP. This is analyzed using monthly data from 1990 to 2005, both in a descriptive sense 
and in a model-dependent framework. The seven Franc CFA countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo) and Guinea-Bissau peg to the euro. Ghana, Nigeria, 
Sierra Leone, Gambia are floaters. If financial reputation is defined as low EMP with low 
volatility, then fixers behave better than floaters. Conditional volatility EMP, reported in 
Figure 6 strengthens conclusions from the unconditional volatility and mean EMP. Lopes and 
Santos (2010) report that real exchange rate depreciation improves financial reputation in 
Cape Verde while doing the opposite in Benin, where it increases EMP mean and volatility. 
This confirms that Cape Verde has had a remarkable degree of credibility and sophistication of 
its exchange markets, undoubtedly due to the quality of the institutional framework. The effect 
of financial expectations also improved substantially since the time of excessive budget 
deficits. The reason for expansionary fiscal policy was the relatively large expenditures 
required to improve living conditions, run the state-controlled industrial sector and pay for the 
high level of imports. The deficit was also high due to interest payments on domestic and 
foreign debt, leading to a loss of foreign exchange reserves and financial reputation. It was 
only in the late 1990s that the deficit was reduced. This change was accompanied by measures 
to control inflation and strengthen the financial sector. In 1997, a program was adopted that 
did away with domestic bank financing to be substituted by that obtained from foreign 
sources. As a result, the 1998 budget deficit was financed entirely by foreign creditors whereas 
domestic creditors had accounted for 10% of GDP and foreign one almost 1% in 1997. Once 
again, the peg to the Euro, which allowed for low inflation rates and increased financial 
reputation, was crucial in obtaining the needed international finance. The government also 
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speeded up the privatization process, improved tax collection and increased the recovery of 
debt obligations from public enterprises. Current primary expenditure was curtailed to offset 
higher interest revenue and the government abstained from pre-financing donor-supported 
investment projects. The composition of the expenditures was also modified while maintaining 
their level. With these measures, the budgetary position changed from a deficit 15.1% of GDP 
in 1997 to a surplus of 0.5% in 2000.  
The 2001 elections brought about some fiscal slippage but the newly elected PAICV 
government then sought to reduce the deficit, as well as domestic and external public debt, 
without overly increasing the tax burden. More recent reforms have streamlined and 
rationalized taxes on imports, accompanied by a general reduction of customs duties and 
excises. At the same time, public spending was redirected towards education, health, and other 
priority areas, in accordance with the government’s poverty reduction strategy.  Transfers and 
subsidies were also reduced substantially, notably subsidies to large public enterprises. As a 
consequence, current revenues increased from approximately 21% of GDP in 2001 to 23% of 
GDP in 2004, while current public expenditures were kept constant at around 21%-22% of 
GDP during the same period. The adoption of an IMF mid-term program in 2006, supported 
by a new non-financial instrument – Policy Support Instrument– confirmed Cape Verde’s 
commitment to maintain the pace of reforms and close dialogue on macro-economic policy. 
The program, completed in 2010, assisted Cape Verde in reducing fiscal risks and minimize 
the impact of external shocks on its economy by promoting the necessary structural reforms 
under IMF advice and supervision. While AEO (2010) maintains a positive assessment on 
financing, the threats to the EU financial system are bound to have a negative effect going 
forward. 
In 1976, Banco de Cabo Verde started operations, succeeding to Banco Nacional Ultramarino 
(the former issuing bank) and Banco de Fomento Nacional (a state-owned development bank). 
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The currency was pegged to the Escudo but in 1977, following Portugal’s devaluation, the peg 
shifted to a basket of currencies. During the eighties, several reforms were put in place, 
namely through the use of information and communication technologies in the central 
administration and a network of bank offices spreading through the archipelago: A newly 
created investment department managed programs supporting productive activities. From 1988 
on, a vast program of reforms began promoting trade liberalization and privatizations while 
the government remained responsible for infrastructures. Successive governments continued 
these reforms, accompanied by an increasing concern with the role of education and good 
governance, which were associated with high growth in the services sector, namely transports, 
hotels, restaurants and communications. By 1980 Cape Verde was largely dependent on 
services. In 1990, monetary and exchange rate policies as well as the supervisory and lender of 
last resort roles of the central bank were reinforced by new by-rules but commercial and 
development activities continued until September 1993. Starting April 1st, 1998, the Cape 
Verde Escudo was pegged to the Euro. In 2002, deficit financing by the central banking was 
also formally prohibited. In practice, the government has not needed to rely on this type of 
financing due to the receipt of donor-aid and the sale of treasury bonds with medium-term 
maturities. Fiscal policy has also been prudent with a medium-term fiscal strategy for 2008-
2010 approved by the IMF. Fiscal reforms were accompanied by an increase in tax effort, 
particularly of income tax, as corporate tax rates are still relatively low. Together, this 
environment of fiscal responsibility has allowed Debt Sustainability Analysis to classify Cape 
Verde’s debt risk as low. The external position continues to depend on transfers, mostly 
migrants remittances. The decreasing role of transfers and the increasing role of portfolio and 
direct investment from abroad erodes remittances’ role as a buffer for households. It is likely 
that second and third generation emigrants will be less inclined to send remittances and will 
only invest in Cape Verde when it is profitable to do so. The government will have to take 
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cognizance of this fact when designing and implementing its medium-term development 
strategy.   
5.3. Millennium Development Goals and Governance Indicators 
The information on MDG is drawn from a report prepared at the request of the Guinean 
presidency of CPLP (IICT, 2007) and from AEO: the ranking always places Cape Verde at the 
top. On the eradication of poverty, Cape Verde has one of the lowest shares of the poorest 
quintile in national consumption. Angel-Urdinola and Wodon (2007) argue that relative 
poverty increased between the 1988/89 and 2001 surveys, based on the increase in the Gini 
coefficient from 50.2% to 53.83%, while absolute poverty measures decreased dramatically. 
On net enrolment in primary education, it is very high even by the developed world’s 
standards, which reflects its focus on education and the quality thereof. On gender parity, Cape 
Verde is better placed than its ECOWAS partners but some of them are now catching-up fast. 
With respect to child mortality, Cape Verde is by far the lowest in ECOWAS and has 
decreased significantly but still far short of the level in developed countries. For the maternal 
mortality ratio per 100,000 live births in 2005 is 210 in Cape Verde and 1027 in ECOWAS 
(there is only one observation, and a higher percentage of satisfactory performance was 
reached in 2009 than in 2010). Similarly, the incidence, prevalence and death rates associated 
with tuberculosis, show much lower figures in Cape Verde than for ECOWAS but there is no 
data on HIV prevalence. The goal of sustainable development is often proxied by the 
proportion of the population having access to safe drinking water source. It is much higher in 
Cape Verde than in ECOWAS.  Similarly, the proportion of the urban population is also higher 
in Cape Verde in spite of a significant catching-up in other ECOWAS member states. The 
global partnership for development is often illustrated by debt service as a percentage of 
exports of goods and services. This has been historically lower in Cape Verde and has 
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decreased over time, but ECOWAS decreased more markedly when looking at the year-by-
year numbers.  
Coming back to the comparison of governance and freedom indicators appearing in Table 1, 
Cape Verde’s Economic Freedom Index has improved since 1996, when it obtained 49.7 
points. However, trade freedom (45), government spending (30.9), financial freedom (10) and 
freedom from corruption (30) were below average. The lack of financial freedom was due to 
commercial banks’ weak independence excessive government spending due to weak industrial 
policies in the transition to independences. Financial freedom only ranked higher in 2002 (50 
points), when a law that gave more independence to the central bank was approved. As for 
government spending, this category reached similar values to current ones in 2004 (around 70 
points) because political measures aimed at controlling the budget deficit started to be 
effective. In the years following 1996, the country’s score has been improving when compared 
on a year-to-year basis, except during 1997, 2003, 2005 and 2007. In 2010, Cape Verde 
reached its maximum score (61.8) and is classified as the 78th freest economy in the world. 
Above average items include business freedom (63.3), trade freedom (65.5), fiscal freedom 
(65.6), government spending (65.3), monetary freedom (74.5) and property rights (65). 
Freedoms in need of improvement were investment freedom (69), financial freedom (60), 
freedom from corruption (51) and labor freedom (48.1). In comparative terms, Cape Verde 
ranked 7th out of 46 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, with a regional score much higher than 
the average. This is due to the fact that regional partners perform even worse in those 
categories where Cape Verde performs poorly. For example, Cape Verde ranks 47th out of 179 
countries in Transparency International’s 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index regarding the 
“freedom from corruption” indicator. However, Cape Verde ranks third when looking at only 
Africa countries, after South Africa and Botswana. 
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IICT (2007) includes the following six governance indicators from the World Bank Institute: 
freedom and accountability (FREE), stability and absence of violence (STAB), government 
efficiency (EF GV), quality of regulation (Q REG), quality of justice (JUST) and control of 
corruption (CORR) which were reported in Table 1. Good governance has been one of the 
main features of Cape Verde’s development. Rule of law and accountability stem from the fact 
that democracy is well established and that free elections take place regularly with the results 
not being disputed. The only aspect that fares worse is regulatory quality but this indicator still 
fares better than most ECOWAS member states. Education is a major concern for Cape Verde 
governments: between 1970 and 1990, the number of children leaving school with secondary 
education increased dramatically. In 1990, half of the children in rural areas attended 
secondary school and 60% of girls received secondary education in urban areas (see Goujon 
and Wils, 1996). The literacy rate in the people between 15 and 24 years old is the highest in 
all ECOWAS.  
Selected indicators in the 2006 and 2007 World Bank Enterprise Surveys are in Tables 3. The 
indicators for ECOWAS are simple averages of the countries, some of which are missing. 
Cape Verde has more developed financial markets, greater macroeconomic stability, less 
corruption and a state where rule of law is more grounded but less export-oriented firms, less 
technology licensed to foreigners, higher taxes and a heavier regulatory framework than 
ECOWAS.  
6. Conclusions 
The expansion, diversification and deepening of trade and financial links between countries 
over several decades presented an unparalleled opportunity to raise living standards and 
achieve the MDG.. Development success under globalization, meanwhile, is less a question of 
relative resource endowments or geographical location than in past waves of globalization. 
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Moreover, adequate development responses to globalization become all the more important as 
globalization increasingly affects political and economic governance, mainly by reducing 
national policy space and increasing institutional and economic interdependence at various 
levels. Under these conditions, interactions between globalization and governance can be 
either positive or negative, depending on the orientation and predictability of economic 
policies and the accompanying institutional arrangements but also on linkages between 
cultural, institutional and economic factors. 
Against this background, the interaction between globalization and governance has been 
positive in Cape Verde as compared to ECOWAS, providing a meaningful benchmark for trade 
diversification and narrowing of the income gap relative to the frontier. This aspect of success 
has to be, in turn, sustained by good governance and level of political and economic freedom 
that their citizens and residents enjoy. As such, policy and institutional reforms provide the 
context against which to interpret governance indicators and progress towards the MDG. 
To identify macro-level policy and institutional combinations underpinning successful export 
diversification and economic convergence in ECOWAS, the empirical analysis establishes 
context-based objective metrics that assess the relative performance of Cape Verde in 
conjunction with evidence of a case-study nature. Given the severe lack of data over the period 
1960-2004, this indirect approach to study trade-related development success is unavoidable. 
Macedo and Pereira (2010) apply Three-Stage Least Squares and other estimation techniques, 
with broadly consistent results, to two main variables: the distance of a country’s GDP per 
capita compared to that of the United States in order to capture economic convergence (ygap) 
and the inverse of the Herfindahl Index (neq5) as a measure of export diversification. Together 
with additional control variables, these two variables are a meaningful characterization of each 
country’s diversification-convergence, which will be affected by the interaction between 
policy and institutional variables.  
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We first identify the determinants of diversification and convergence at the regional level. 
Then, we re-estimate the model for sub-samples that capture two different diversification-
convergence scenarios in each sub-region. The first sub-sample, denoted as the HIGH-regime, 
comprises countries that simultaneously exhibit high diversification and high convergence 
{ygap < 0.945 & neq5 > 4.5} while the second, the LOW-regime, comprises those that exhibit 
the opposite combination{ygap >= 0.945 & neq5 <= 4.5}. This strategy allows us to highlight 
differences and commonalities in performance across regimes and regions including regional 
benchmarks, viz. Senegal.   
ECOWAS HIGH-regime countries are becoming more diversified. As for the commonalities 
or lessons present in the HIGH-regimes, we find that: 1) the expected two-way relationship 
always exists; 2) convergence always entails macroeconomic stability (inflation < 9%, budget 
deficits < 7% of GDP); 3) political and economic freedoms are always greater, on average, 
when compared to the other cases; 4) freedoms always affect diversification policy as do 
government deficits, albeit in different directions across both sub-regions. However, 
increasing deficits always counteract prevailing diversification stance. Another sign of regime 
credibility is that economic freedom always affects diversification in ECOWAS. Efforts at 
monitoring the MDGs complement the context for financial reputation. 
The estimated impact that Cape Verde has on ECOWAS, which accords with the intuition and 
implications of the posited two-way relationship, confirms the narrative of their long-term 
development. Based on our reading of this narrative, we identify the following common 
drivers of macro-level policy and institutional combinations as being associated the (different) 
two-way relationship of both countries: moving towards a market economy; opening up to 
regional and global trade; increasing economic and political freedom; pursing macroeconomic 
stability and financial reputation; ensuring policy continuity (especially in trade and industrial 
sectors) and focusing on human development (especially poverty reduction and education). 
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This case study underscores the potential for cooperative governance and peer-review 
mechanisms outside of its usual domain among OECD and EU member countries. The 
“culture of peace” helped sustain the move towards a market economy, through greater trade 
integration especially with the EU and the US, culminating in the membership in the WTO. 
Multi-party democracy and greater political freedom and civil liberties allowed policy 
continuity across the political divide and improved human development. This is not to say that 
human development is sustainable in the face of the current global crisis. In effect, 
macroeconomic stability was threatened from outside but also through an insufficient attention 
to public and external deficits. If not appropriately monitored, it could threaten the aspirational 
foreign policy that Cape Verde’s governments have been willing and able to pursue. 
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Table 1: World Bank Governance Indicators (1996-2007) 
 
 CV ECOWAS 
Rule of Law 0.48 -0.75 
Voice and Accountability 0.65 -0.51 
Political Stability, Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism 0.96 -0.49 
Government Effectiveness 0.11 -0.77 
Regulatory Quality -0.25 -0.65 
Control of Corruption 0.33 -0.66 
Note: data are fitted to a normal distribution centered on zero 
 
 
Table 2 Nominal and Real Effective Exchange Rates based on Consumer Prices 
 Nominal Real 
2000 100 100 
2001 102 100 
2002 103 100 
2003 106 100 
2004 106 96 
2005 104 92 
2006 104 94 
2007 103 96 
2008 103 100 
2009 104 101 
2010 102 100 
2011 102 101 
Source: Banco de Portugal (2012) 
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Table 3: World Bank Enterprise Survey  
  
 CV ECW 
International Trade   
Exporting Firms % 4 11 
Time Imports Days 11 10 
Import License Days 6 16 
Foreign Technology % 2 8 
Foreign Shareholder % 10 12 
Infrastructure   
# Electricity Outages/ month 21 16 
# Internet Outages/ month 4 86 
# Water Outages/ month 13 9 
Transportation % bad 36 49 
Access to Land % bad 19 36 
Finance, Competition, Education   
Credit Line %good 47 20 
Investment Own Funds %good 51 80 
Access to Finance % bad 48 68 
Number Competitors 4 4 
Education Workers % bad 43 28 
Quality of regulation   
Time Senior Mgt Regulations % bad 14 8 
Tax administration % bad 41 48 
Tax rates % bad 74 61 
Licensing Permits % bad 29 33 
Labor Regulations % bad 28 16 
Customs & Trade Regulations % bad 38 30 
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Figure 1 Cape Verde and ECOWAS GDP per capita in international $ 
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Figure 5: Relation between Economic and Political Freedoms in ECOWAS 
 
GIN
TGO
NER
CIV
GNB
SLE
MLI
BFA
BEN
NGA
GHA
SEN CPV
GMB
3
.5
4
4
.5
5
5
.5
e
f 
m
e
a
n
2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5
prcl mean
Lowess smoothing, bandwidth = 0.8
ECONOMIC vs POLITICAL FREEDOM - COUNTRY MEANS
ECOWAS
 
  
Figure 6 Conditional volatility of EMP Cape Verde vs ECOWAS 
 
 

